You're looking at an unstable version of this specification. Unstable specifications may change at any time without notice.
Appendices
Unpadded Base64
Unpadded Base64 refers to ‘standard’ Base64 encoding as defined in
RFC 4648, without “=” padding.
Specifically, where RFC 4648 requires that encoded data be padded to a
multiple of four characters using =
characters, unpadded Base64 omits
this padding.
For reference, RFC 4648 uses the following alphabet for Base 64:
Value Encoding Value Encoding Value Encoding Value Encoding
0 A 17 R 34 i 51 z
1 B 18 S 35 j 52 0
2 C 19 T 36 k 53 1
3 D 20 U 37 l 54 2
4 E 21 V 38 m 55 3
5 F 22 W 39 n 56 4
6 G 23 X 40 o 57 5
7 H 24 Y 41 p 58 6
8 I 25 Z 42 q 59 7
9 J 26 a 43 r 60 8
10 K 27 b 44 s 61 9
11 L 28 c 45 t 62 +
12 M 29 d 46 u 63 /
13 N 30 e 47 v
14 O 31 f 48 w
15 P 32 g 49 x
16 Q 33 h 50 y
Examples of strings encoded using unpadded Base64:
UNPADDED_BASE64("") = ""
UNPADDED_BASE64("f") = "Zg"
UNPADDED_BASE64("fo") = "Zm8"
UNPADDED_BASE64("foo") = "Zm9v"
UNPADDED_BASE64("foob") = "Zm9vYg"
UNPADDED_BASE64("fooba") = "Zm9vYmE"
UNPADDED_BASE64("foobar") = "Zm9vYmFy"
When decoding Base64, implementations SHOULD accept input with or without padding characters wherever possible, to ensure maximum interoperability.
Signing JSON
Various points in the Matrix specification require JSON objects to be cryptographically signed. This requires us to encode the JSON as a binary string. Unfortunately the same JSON can be encoded in different ways by changing how much white space is used or by changing the order of keys within objects.
Signing an object therefore requires it to be encoded as a sequence of bytes using Canonical JSON, computing the signature for that sequence and then adding the signature to the original JSON object.
Canonical JSON
We define the canonical JSON encoding for a value to be the shortest
UTF-8 JSON encoding with dictionary keys lexicographically sorted by
Unicode codepoint. Numbers in the JSON must be integers in the range
[-(2**53)+1, (2**53)-1]
.
We pick UTF-8 as the encoding as it should be available to all platforms and JSON received from the network is likely to be already encoded using UTF-8. We sort the keys to give a consistent ordering. We force integers to be in the range where they can be accurately represented using IEEE double precision floating point numbers since a number of JSON libraries represent all numbers using this representation.
Events in room versions 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 might not be fully compliant with these restrictions. Servers SHOULD be capable of handling JSON which is considered invalid by these restrictions where possible.
The most notable consideration is that integers might not be in the range specified above.
import json
def canonical_json(value):
return json.dumps(
value,
# Encode code-points outside of ASCII as UTF-8 rather than \u escapes
ensure_ascii=False,
# Remove unnecessary white space.
separators=(',',':'),
# Sort the keys of dictionaries.
sort_keys=True,
# Encode the resulting Unicode as UTF-8 bytes.
).encode("UTF-8")
Grammar
Adapted from the grammar in http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7159 removing insignificant whitespace, fractions, exponents and redundant character escapes.
value = false / null / true / object / array / number / string
false = %x66.61.6c.73.65
null = %x6e.75.6c.6c
true = %x74.72.75.65
object = %x7B [ member *( %x2C member ) ] %7D
member = string %x3A value
array = %x5B [ value *( %x2C value ) ] %5B
number = [ %x2D ] int
int = %x30 / ( %x31-39 *digit )
digit = %x30-39
string = %x22 *char %x22
char = unescaped / %x5C escaped
unescaped = %x20-21 / %x23-5B / %x5D-10FFFF
escaped = %x22 ; " quotation mark U+0022
/ %x5C ; \ reverse solidus U+005C
/ %x62 ; b backspace U+0008
/ %x66 ; f form feed U+000C
/ %x6E ; n line feed U+000A
/ %x72 ; r carriage return U+000D
/ %x74 ; t tab U+0009
/ %x75.30.30.30 (%x30-37 / %x62 / %x65-66) ; u000X
/ %x75.30.30.31 (%x30-39 / %x61-66) ; u001X
Examples
To assist in the development of compatible implementations, the following test values may be useful for verifying the canonical transformation code.
Given the following JSON object:
{}
The following canonical JSON should be produced:
{}
Given the following JSON object:
{
"one": 1,
"two": "Two"
}
The following canonical JSON should be produced:
{"one":1,"two":"Two"}
Given the following JSON object:
{
"b": "2",
"a": "1"
}
The following canonical JSON should be produced:
{"a":"1","b":"2"}
Given the following JSON object:
{"b":"2","a":"1"}
The following canonical JSON should be produced:
{"a":"1","b":"2"}
Given the following JSON object:
{
"auth": {
"success": true,
"mxid": "@john.doe:example.com",
"profile": {
"display_name": "John Doe",
"three_pids": [
{
"medium": "email",
"address": "john.doe@example.org"
},
{
"medium": "msisdn",
"address": "123456789"
}
]
}
}
}
The following canonical JSON should be produced:
{"auth":{"mxid":"@john.doe:example.com","profile":{"display_name":"John Doe","three_pids":[{"address":"john.doe@example.org","medium":"email"},{"address":"123456789","medium":"msisdn"}]},"success":true}}
Given the following JSON object:
{
"a": "日本語"
}
The following canonical JSON should be produced:
{"a":"日本語"}
Given the following JSON object:
{
"本": 2,
"日": 1
}
The following canonical JSON should be produced:
{"日":1,"本":2}
Given the following JSON object:
{
"a": "\u65E5"
}
The following canonical JSON should be produced:
{"a":"日"}
Given the following JSON object:
{
"a": null
}
The following canonical JSON should be produced:
{"a":null}
Signing Details
JSON is signed by encoding the JSON object without signatures
or keys
grouped as unsigned
, using the canonical encoding described above. The
JSON bytes are then signed using the signature algorithm and the
signature is encoded using unpadded Base64. The resulting base64
signature is added to an object under the signing key identifier which
is added to the signatures
object under the name of the entity signing
it which is added back to the original JSON object along with the
unsigned
object.
The signing key identifier is the concatenation of the signing
algorithm and a key identifier. The signing algorithm identifies
the algorithm used to sign the JSON. The currently supported value for
signing algorithm is ed25519
as implemented by NACL
(http://nacl.cr.yp.to/). The key identifier is used to distinguish
between different signing keys used by the same entity.
The unsigned
object and the signatures
object are not covered by the
signature. Therefore intermediate entities can add unsigned data such as
timestamps and additional signatures.
{
"name": "example.org",
"signing_keys": {
"ed25519:1": "XSl0kuyvrXNj6A+7/tkrB9sxSbRi08Of5uRhxOqZtEQ"
},
"unsigned": {
"age_ts": 922834800000
},
"signatures": {
"example.org": {
"ed25519:1": "s76RUgajp8w172am0zQb/iPTHsRnb4SkrzGoeCOSFfcBY2V/1c8QfrmdXHpvnc2jK5BD1WiJIxiMW95fMjK7Bw"
}
}
}
def sign_json(json_object, signing_key, signing_name):
signatures = json_object.pop("signatures", {})
unsigned = json_object.pop("unsigned", None)
signed = signing_key.sign(encode_canonical_json(json_object))
signature_base64 = encode_base64(signed.signature)
key_id = "%s:%s" % (signing_key.alg, signing_key.version)
signatures.setdefault(signing_name, {})[key_id] = signature_base64
json_object["signatures"] = signatures
if unsigned is not None:
json_object["unsigned"] = unsigned
return json_object
Checking for a Signature
To check if an entity has signed a JSON object an implementation does the following:
- Checks if the
signatures
member of the object contains an entry with the name of the entity. If the entry is missing then the check fails. - Removes any signing key identifiers from the entry with algorithms it doesn’t understand. If there are no signing key identifiers left then the check fails.
- Looks up verification keys for the remaining signing key identifiers either from a local cache or by consulting a trusted key server. If it cannot find a verification key then the check fails.
- Decodes the base64 encoded signature bytes. If base64 decoding fails then the check fails.
- Removes the
signatures
andunsigned
members of the object. - Encodes the remainder of the JSON object using the Canonical JSON encoding.
- Checks the signature bytes against the encoded object using the verification key. If this fails then the check fails. Otherwise the check succeeds.
Identifier Grammar
Some identifiers are specific to given room versions, please refer to the room versions specification for more information.
Server Name
A homeserver is uniquely identified by its server name. This value is used in a number of identifiers, as described below.
The server name represents the address at which the homeserver in question can be reached by other homeservers. All valid server names are included by the following grammar:
server_name = hostname [ ":" port ]
port = 1*5DIGIT
hostname = IPv4address / "[" IPv6address "]" / dns-name
IPv4address = 1*3DIGIT "." 1*3DIGIT "." 1*3DIGIT "." 1*3DIGIT
IPv6address = 2*45IPv6char
IPv6char = DIGIT / %x41-46 / %x61-66 / ":" / "."
; 0-9, A-F, a-f, :, .
dns-name = 1*255dns-char
dns-char = DIGIT / ALPHA / "-" / "."
— in other words, the server name is the hostname, followed by an optional numeric port specifier. The hostname may be a dotted-quad IPv4 address literal, an IPv6 address literal surrounded with square brackets, or a DNS name.
IPv4 literals must be a sequence of four decimal numbers in the range 0
to 255, separated by .
. IPv6 literals must be as specified by
RFC3513, section 2.2.
DNS names for use with Matrix should follow the conventional
restrictions for internet hostnames: they should consist of a series of
labels separated by .
, where each label consists of the alphanumeric
characters or hyphens.
Examples of valid server names are:
matrix.org
matrix.org:8888
1.2.3.4
(IPv4 literal)1.2.3.4:1234
(IPv4 literal with explicit port)[1234:5678::abcd]
(IPv6 literal)[1234:5678::abcd]:5678
(IPv6 literal with explicit port)
Server names must be treated case-sensitively: in other words,
@user:matrix.org
is a different person from @user:MATRIX.ORG
.
Some recommendations for a choice of server name follow:
- The length of the complete server name should not exceed 230 characters.
- Server names should not use upper-case characters.
Common Identifier Format
The Matrix protocol uses a common format to assign unique identifiers to a number of entities, including users, events and rooms. Each identifier takes the form:
&string
where &
represents a ‘sigil’ character; string
is the string which
makes up the identifier.
The sigil characters are as follows:
@
: User ID!
: Room ID$
: Event ID+
: Group ID#
: Room alias
User IDs, group IDs, room IDs, room aliases, and sometimes event IDs take the form:
&localpart:domain
where domain
is the server name of the homeserver
which allocated the identifier, and localpart
is an identifier
allocated by that homeserver.
The precise grammar defining the allowable format of an identifier
depends on the type of identifier. For example, event IDs can sometimes
be represented with a domain
component under some conditions - see the
Event IDs section below for more information.
User Identifiers
Users within Matrix are uniquely identified by their Matrix user ID. The user ID is namespaced to the homeserver which allocated the account and has the form:
@localpart:domain
The localpart
of a user ID is an opaque identifier for that user. It
MUST NOT be empty, and MUST contain only the characters a-z
, 0-9
,
.
, _
, =
, -
, and /
.
The domain
of a user ID is the server name of the
homeserver which allocated the account.
The length of a user ID, including the @
sigil and the domain, MUST
NOT exceed 255 characters.
The complete grammar for a legal user ID is:
user_id = "@" user_id_localpart ":" server_name
user_id_localpart = 1*user_id_char
user_id_char = DIGIT
/ %x61-7A ; a-z
/ "-" / "." / "=" / "_" / "/"
A number of factors were considered when defining the allowable characters for a user ID.
Firstly, we chose to exclude characters outside the basic US-ASCII character set. User IDs are primarily intended for use as an identifier at the protocol level, and their use as a human-readable handle is of secondary benefit. Furthermore, they are useful as a last-resort differentiator between users with similar display names. Allowing the full Unicode character set would make very difficult for a human to distinguish two similar user IDs. The limited character set used has the advantage that even a user unfamiliar with the Latin alphabet should be able to distinguish similar user IDs manually, if somewhat laboriously.
We chose to disallow upper-case characters because we do not consider it
valid to have two user IDs which differ only in case: indeed it should
be possible to reach @user:matrix.org
as @USER:matrix.org
. However,
user IDs are necessarily used in a number of situations which are
inherently case-sensitive (notably in the state_key
of m.room.member
events). Forbidding upper-case characters (and requiring homeservers to
downcase usernames when creating user IDs for new users) is a relatively
simple way to ensure that @USER:matrix.org
cannot refer to a different
user to @user:matrix.org
.
Finally, we decided to restrict the allowable punctuation to a very basic set to reduce the possibility of conflicts with special characters in various situations. For example, “*” is used as a wildcard in some APIs (notably the filter API), so it cannot be a legal user ID character.
The length restriction is derived from the limit on the length of the
sender
key on events; since the user ID appears in every event sent by
the user, it is limited to ensure that the user ID does not dominate
over the actual content of the events.
Matrix user IDs are sometimes informally referred to as MXIDs.
Historical User IDs
Older versions of this specification were more tolerant of the
characters permitted in user ID localparts. There are currently active
users whose user IDs do not conform to the permitted character set, and
a number of rooms whose history includes events with a sender
which
does not conform. In order to handle these rooms successfully, clients
and servers MUST accept user IDs with localparts from the expanded
character set:
extended_user_id_char = %x21-39 / %x3B-7E ; all ASCII printing chars except :
Mapping from other character sets
In certain circumstances it will be desirable to map from a wider
character set onto the limited character set allowed in a user ID
localpart. Examples include a homeserver creating a user ID for a new
user based on the username passed to /register
, or a bridge mapping
user ids from another protocol.
Implementations are free to do this mapping however they choose. Since the user ID is opaque except to the implementation which created it, the only requirement is that the implementation can perform the mapping consistently. However, we suggest the following algorithm:
- Encode character strings as UTF-8.
- Convert the bytes
A-Z
to lower-case.- In the case where a bridge must be able to distinguish two
different users with ids which differ only by case, escape
upper-case characters by prefixing with
_
before downcasing. For example,A
becomes_a
. Escape a real_
with a second_
.
- In the case where a bridge must be able to distinguish two
different users with ids which differ only by case, escape
upper-case characters by prefixing with
- Encode any remaining bytes outside the allowed character set, as
well as
=
, as their hexadecimal value, prefixed with=
. For example,#
becomes=23
;á
becomes=c3=a1
.
Room IDs and Event IDs
A room has exactly one room ID. A room ID has the format:
!opaque_id:domain
An event has exactly one event ID. The format of an event ID depends upon the room version specification.
The domain
of a room ID is the server name of the
homeserver which created the room/event. The domain is used only for
namespacing to avoid the risk of clashes of identifiers between
different homeservers. There is no implication that the room or event in
question is still available at the corresponding homeserver.
Event IDs and Room IDs are case-sensitive. They are not meant to be human-readable. They are intended to be treated as fully opaque strings by clients.
Group Identifiers
Groups within Matrix are uniquely identified by their group ID. The group ID is namespaced to the group server which hosts this group and has the form:
+localpart:domain
The localpart
of a group ID is an opaque identifier for that group. It
MUST NOT be empty, and MUST contain only the characters a-z
, 0-9
,
.
, _
, =
, -
, and /
.
The domain
of a group ID is the server name of the
group server which hosts this group.
The length of a group ID, including the +
sigil and the domain, MUST
NOT exceed 255 characters.
The complete grammar for a legal group ID is:
group_id = "+" group_id_localpart ":" server_name
group_id_localpart = 1*group_id_char
group_id_char = DIGIT
/ %x61-7A ; a-z
/ "-" / "." / "=" / "_" / "/"
Room Aliases
A room may have zero or more aliases. A room alias has the format:
#room_alias:domain
The domain
of a room alias is the server name of the
homeserver which created the alias. Other servers may contact this
homeserver to look up the alias.
Room aliases MUST NOT exceed 255 bytes (including the #
sigil and the
domain).
matrix.to navigation
matrix://
(or similar) URI
scheme. This is not meant to be interpreted as an available web
service - see below for more details.
Rooms, users, aliases, and groups may be represented as a “matrix.to” URI. This URI can be used to reference particular objects in a given context, such as mentioning a user in a message or linking someone to a particular point in the room’s history (a permalink).
A matrix.to URI has the following format, based upon the specification defined in RFC 3986:
https://matrix.to/#/<identifier>/<extra parameter>?<additional arguments>
The identifier may be a room ID, room alias, user ID, or group ID. The
extra parameter is only used in the case of permalinks where an event ID
is referenced. The matrix.to URI, when referenced, must always start
with https://matrix.to/#/
followed by the identifier.
The <additional arguments>
and the preceding question mark are
optional and only apply in certain circumstances, documented below.
Clients should not rely on matrix.to URIs falling back to a web server if accessed and instead should perform some sort of action within the client. For example, if the user were to click on a matrix.to URI for a room alias, the client may open a view for the user to participate in the room.
The components of the matrix.to URI (<identifier>
and
<extra parameter>
) are to be percent-encoded as per RFC 3986.
Examples of matrix.to URIs are:
- Room alias:
https://matrix.to/#/%23somewhere%3Aexample.org
- Room:
https://matrix.to/#/!somewhere%3Aexample.org
- Permalink by room:
https://matrix.to/#/!somewhere%3Aexample.org/%24event%3Aexample.org
- Permalink by room alias:
https://matrix.to/#/%23somewhere:example.org/%24event%3Aexample.org
- User:
https://matrix.to/#/%40alice%3Aexample.org
- Group:
https://matrix.to/#/%2Bexample%3Aexample.org
Routing
Room IDs are not routable on their own as there is no reliable domain to
send requests to. This is partially mitigated with the addition of a
via
argument on a matrix.to URI, however the problem of routability is
still present. Clients should do their best to route Room IDs to where
they need to go, however they should also be aware of issue
#1579.
A room (or room permalink) which isn’t using a room alias should supply
at least one server using via
in the <additional arguments>
, like
so:
https://matrix.to/!somewhere%3Aexample.org?via=example.org&via=alt.example.org
.
The parameter can be supplied multiple times to specify multiple servers
to try.
The values of via
are intended to be passed along as the server_name
parameters on the Client Server /join
API.
When generating room links and permalinks, the application should pick servers which have a high probability of being in the room in the distant future. How these servers are picked is left as an implementation detail, however the current recommendation is to pick 3 unique servers based on the following criteria:
- The first server should be the server of the highest power level user in the room, provided they are at least power level 50. If no user meets this criterion, pick the most popular server in the room (most joined users). The rationale for not picking users with power levels under 50 is that they are unlikely to be around into the distant future while higher ranking users (and therefore servers) are less likely to give up their power and move somewhere else. Most rooms in the public federation have a power level 100 user and have not deviated from the default structure where power level 50 users have moderator-style privileges.
- The second server should be the next highest server by population, or the first highest by population if the first server was based on a user’s power level. The rationale for picking popular servers is that the server is unlikely to be removed as the room naturally grows in membership due to that server joining users. The server could be refused participation in the future due to server ACLs or similar, however the chance of that happening to a server which is organically joining the room is unlikely.
- The third server should be the next highest server by population.
- Servers which are blocked due to server ACLs should never be chosen.
- Servers which are IP addresses should never be chosen. Servers which use a domain name are less likely to be unroutable in the future whereas IP addresses cannot be pointed to a different location and therefore higher risk options.
- All 3 servers should be unique from each other. If the room does not
have enough users to supply 3 servers, the application should only
specify the servers it can. For example, a room with only 2 users in
it would result in maximum 2
via
parameters.
3PID Types
Third Party Identifiers (3PIDs) represent identifiers on other
namespaces that might be associated with a particular person. They
comprise a tuple of medium
which is a string that identifies the
namespace in which the identifier exists, and an address
: a string
representing the identifier in that namespace. This must be a canonical
form of the identifier, i.e. if multiple strings could represent the
same identifier, only one of these strings must be used in a 3PID
address, in a well-defined manner.
For example, for e-mail, the medium
is ‘email’ and the address
would
be the email address, e.g. the string bob@example.com
. Since domain
resolution is case-insensitive, the email address bob@Example.com
is
also has the 3PID address of bob@example.com
(without the capital ‘e’)
rather than bob@Example.com
.
The namespaces defined by this specification are listed below. More namespaces may be defined in future versions of this specification.
Medium: email
Represents E-Mail addresses. The address
is the raw email address in
user@domain
form with the domain in lowercase. It must not contain
other text such as real name, angle brackets or a mailto: prefix.
PSTN Phone numbers
Medium: msisdn
Represents telephone numbers on the public switched telephone network.
The address
is the telephone number represented as a MSISDN (Mobile
Station International Subscriber Directory Number) as defined by the
E.164 numbering plan. Note that MSISDNs do not include a leading ‘+’.
Security Threat Model
Denial of Service
The attacker could attempt to prevent delivery of messages to or from the victim in order to:
- Disrupt service or marketing campaign of a commercial competitor.
- Censor a discussion or censor a participant in a discussion.
- Perform general vandalism.
Threat: Resource Exhaustion
An attacker could cause the victim’s server to exhaust a particular resource (e.g. open TCP connections, CPU, memory, disk storage)
Threat: Unrecoverable Consistency Violations
An attacker could send messages which created an unrecoverable “split-brain” state in the cluster such that the victim’s servers could no longer derive a consistent view of the chatroom state.
Threat: Bad History
An attacker could convince the victim to accept invalid messages which the victim would then include in their view of the chatroom history. Other servers in the chatroom would reject the invalid messages and potentially reject the victims messages as well since they depended on the invalid messages.
Threat: Block Network Traffic
An attacker could try to firewall traffic between the victim’s server and some or all of the other servers in the chatroom.
Threat: High Volume of Messages
An attacker could send large volumes of messages to a chatroom with the victim making the chatroom unusable.
Threat: Banning users without necessary authorisation
An attacker could attempt to ban a user from a chatroom without the necessary authorisation.
Spoofing
An attacker could try to send a message claiming to be from the victim without the victim having sent the message in order to:
- Impersonate the victim while performing illicit activity.
- Obtain privileges of the victim.
Threat: Altering Message Contents
An attacker could try to alter the contents of an existing message from the victim.
Threat: Fake Message “origin” Field
An attacker could try to send a new message purporting to be from the victim with a phony “origin” field.
Spamming
The attacker could try to send a high volume of solicited or unsolicited messages to the victim in order to:
- Find victims for scams.
- Market unwanted products.
Threat: Unsolicited Messages
An attacker could try to send messages to victims who do not wish to receive them.
Threat: Abusive Messages
An attacker could send abusive or threatening messages to the victim
Spying
The attacker could try to access message contents or metadata for messages sent by the victim or to the victim that were not intended to reach the attacker in order to:
- Gain sensitive personal or commercial information.
- Impersonate the victim using credentials contained in the messages. (e.g. password reset messages)
- Discover who the victim was talking to and when.
Threat: Disclosure during Transmission
An attacker could try to expose the message contents or metadata during transmission between the servers.
Threat: Disclosure to Servers Outside Chatroom
An attacker could try to convince servers within a chatroom to send messages to a server it controls that was not authorised to be within the chatroom.
Threat: Disclosure to Servers Within Chatroom
An attacker could take control of a server within a chatroom to expose message contents or metadata for messages in that room.
Cryptographic Test Vectors
To assist in the development of compatible implementations, the following test values may be useful for verifying the cryptographic event signing code.
Signing Key
The following test vectors all use the 32-byte value given by the
following Base64-encoded string as the seed for generating the ed25519
signing key:
SIGNING_KEY_SEED = decode_base64(
"YJDBA9Xnr2sVqXD9Vj7XVUnmFZcZrlw8Md7kMW+3XA1"
)
In each case, the server name and key ID are as follows:
SERVER_NAME = "domain"
KEY_ID = "ed25519:1"
JSON Signing
Given an empty JSON object:
{}
The JSON signing algorithm should emit the following signed data:
{
"signatures": {
"domain": {
"ed25519:1": "K8280/U9SSy9IVtjBuVeLr+HpOB4BQFWbg+UZaADMtTdGYI7Geitb76LTrr5QV/7Xg4ahLwYGYZzuHGZKM5ZAQ"
}
}
}
Given the following JSON object with data values in it:
{
"one": 1,
"two": "Two"
}
The JSON signing algorithm should emit the following signed JSON:
{
"one": 1,
"signatures": {
"domain": {
"ed25519:1": "KqmLSbO39/Bzb0QIYE82zqLwsA+PDzYIpIRA2sRQ4sL53+sN6/fpNSoqE7BP7vBZhG6kYdD13EIMJpvhJI+6Bw"
}
},
"two": "Two"
}
Event Signing
Given the following minimally-sized event:
{
"room_id": "!x:domain",
"sender": "@a:domain",
"origin": "domain",
"origin_server_ts": 1000000,
"signatures": {},
"hashes": {},
"type": "X",
"content": {},
"prev_events": [],
"auth_events": [],
"depth": 3,
"unsigned": {
"age_ts": 1000000
}
}
The event signing algorithm should emit the following signed event:
{
"auth_events": [],
"content": {},
"depth": 3,
"hashes": {
"sha256": "5jM4wQpv6lnBo7CLIghJuHdW+s2CMBJPUOGOC89ncos"
},
"origin": "domain",
"origin_server_ts": 1000000,
"prev_events": [],
"room_id": "!x:domain",
"sender": "@a:domain",
"signatures": {
"domain": {
"ed25519:1": "KxwGjPSDEtvnFgU00fwFz+l6d2pJM6XBIaMEn81SXPTRl16AqLAYqfIReFGZlHi5KLjAWbOoMszkwsQma+lYAg"
}
},
"type": "X",
"unsigned": {
"age_ts": 1000000
}
}
Given the following event containing redactable content:
{
"content": {
"body": "Here is the message content"
},
"event_id": "$0:domain",
"origin": "domain",
"origin_server_ts": 1000000,
"type": "m.room.message",
"room_id": "!r:domain",
"sender": "@u:domain",
"signatures": {},
"unsigned": {
"age_ts": 1000000
}
}
The event signing algorithm should emit the following signed event:
{
"content": {
"body": "Here is the message content"
},
"event_id": "$0:domain",
"hashes": {
"sha256": "onLKD1bGljeBWQhWZ1kaP9SorVmRQNdN5aM2JYU2n/g"
},
"origin": "domain",
"origin_server_ts": 1000000,
"type": "m.room.message",
"room_id": "!r:domain",
"sender": "@u:domain",
"signatures": {
"domain": {
"ed25519:1": "Wm+VzmOUOz08Ds+0NTWb1d4CZrVsJSikkeRxh6aCcUwu6pNC78FunoD7KNWzqFn241eYHYMGCA5McEiVPdhzBA"
}
},
"unsigned": {
"age_ts": 1000000
}
}